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Through a series of examples, we illustrate some important drawbacks that the action logic frame-
work suffers from in its ability to represent the dynamics of information updates. We argue that these
problems stem from the fact that the action model, a central construct designed to encode agents’
uncertainty about actions, is itself effectively common knowledge amongst the agents. In response
to these difficulties, we motivate and propose an alternative semantics that avoids them by (roughly
speaking) endogenizing the action model. We discuss the relationshop to action logic, and provide a
sound and complete axiomatization.
1 Introduction
Action Logic (AL) is a framework for reasoning about how knowledge and belief changes on the ba-
sis of incoming information [2, 1, 4].1 Information is conveyed in the form of “epistemic actions”,
with a canonical example being public announcements [7]. Unlike Public Announcement Logic (PAL),
however, AL does not presume that all epistemic actions are public in the sense of becoming common
knowledge, nor that such actions can always be distinguished from one another by the agents. Uncer-
tainty about epistemic actions is explicitly encoded in a structure called an action model; this allows for
the representation of scenarios in which agents can be uncertain about which action has taken place.
By design, this formalism is well-equipped to capture uncertainty about actions themselves; how-
ever, we argue in this paper that the AL framework is ill-suited to the representation of higher-order
uncertainty about actions. Roughly speaking, this is because the action model that captures uncertainty
about actions is itself effectively common knowledge amongst the agents, making it awkward to encode,
for example, one agent’s uncertainty about another agent’s uncertainty about actions.
We expose this difficulty through a series of motivating examples. We demonstrate that AL can
capture higher-order uncertainty about actions only by expanding the action model in such a way as to
essentially “pre-encode” the desired uncertainty; this makes choosing an appropriate action model for
any given application problematically post hoc. Furthermore, we show that in such cases small variations
in the background epistemic conditions require corresponding alterations to the action models in order
to ensure that the “pre-encoded” uncertainty maintains the right form. These observations seriously
undermine the practical applicability of AL as a tool for reasoning about information updates.
In response to these challenges, we reformulate the semantics by “endogenizing” the action model;
somewhat more precisely, we allow each agent’s uncertainty about actions to be world-dependent, and
therefore itself subject to uncertainty. Revisiting our examples, we show that these revised semantics
completely circumvent the earlier difficulties; our semantics capture formally the informal process un-
derlying the aforementioned post hoc expansion of the action model.
1Terminology varies; some authors instead use Dynamic Epistemic Logic to refer to this framework [6, §2.2.2]. We follow
van Ditmarsch et al. [4] in using it instead as an umbrella term for a collection of thematically related logics of information
change, including Action Logic.
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The idea of representing higher-order uncertainty about epistemic actions by encoding extra infor-
mation about the agents (and their perceptions of such actions) into the state space is a natural one; it
occurs also in [3], in which Bolander et al. study a more general class of announcements that may not be
entirely public in that (loosely speaking) some agents may not be “listening”. In essence, their semantics
work by encoding into each possible world whether or not each agent is “paying attention” at that world.
As the authors show, such “attention-based” announcements can also be described using action models.
The present work is more general in that we begin with the full action model framework rather than PAL,
and we encode into each world the full spectrum of each agent’s uncertainty regarding epistemic actions,
not just whether or not they are attentive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we motivate and define the basic AL
framework, and present a series of examples intended to illustrate its limitations. In Section 3, we
present our new semantics and show how it deals with the problems discussed in the previous section.
Section 4 presents an axiomatization.
2 Action Logic
We begin by reviewing the foundational definitions and motivations of AL, largely following van Dit-
marsch et al. [4, Chapter 6]. This logic is an extension of standard epistemic logic, so we begin there.
Fix a countable set of primitive propositions PROP and a finite set of agents G. Let LEL denote the
language recursively defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p |¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ψ |K jϕ ,
where p ∈ PROP and j ∈ G. We read K jϕ as “agent j knows that ϕ”. Thus, LEL is a language for
reasoning about the knowledge of the agents in G. The other Boolean connectives can be defined in the
usual way; we write Kˆ j to abbreviate ¬K j¬, and read Kˆ jϕ as “agent j considers it possible that ϕ”.
An epistemic model is a structure of the form M = 〈W,{∼ j: j ∈G},V 〉, where:
• W is a (nonempty) set of states,
• ∼ j is an equivalence relation on W ,
• V : PROP→ 2W is a valuation function.
Intuitively, V specifies for each primitive proposition those states where it is true, while the relations
∼ j capture indistinguishability from the perspective of agent j. These intuitions are formalized in the
following semantic clauses:
(M,w)  p iff w ∈V (p)
(M,w)  ¬ϕ iff (M,w) 2 ϕ
(M,w)  ϕ ∧ψ iff (M,w)  ϕ and (M,w)  ψ
(M,w)  K jϕ iff (∀w
′ ∈ [w] j)((M,w)  ϕ),
where [w] j denotes the equivalence class of w under ∼ j. Thus, the Boolean connectives are interpreted
as usual, and K jϕ is true at w precisely when ϕ is true at all worlds that agent j cannot distinguish from
w. Insisting that the indistinguishability relations be equivalence relations results in a logic of knowledge
that is factive and fully introspective. For a more thorough development of differing logics of knowledge
we direct the reader to [5].
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On top of this basic epistemic framework, Action Logic adds a layer of structure that aims to capture
the epistemic dynamics of information update. An action model is a structure of the form
A = 〈Σ,{≈ j: j ∈ G},Pre〉
where:
• Σ is a (nonempty) set of epistemic actions,
• ≈ j is an equivalence relation on Σ,
• Pre : Σ→LEL is a precondition function.
Intuitively, the relation ≈ j captures indistinguishability of actions from the perspective of agent j, while
the function Pre captures the background conditions Pre(σ) that must hold for a given action σ to be
successfully performed. In short, an action model specifies a set of epistemic actions that can be executed
together with their preconditions and the extent to which they can be individuated by the agents.
To formalize these intuitions, we must define the process by which an epistemic model M is updated
based on the performance of an epistemic action from A. This is captured in the updated model
MA = 〈WΣ,{∼
′
j: j ∈ G},V
′〉
defined as follows:
• WΣ = {(w,σ) : (M,w)  Pre(σ)},
• (w0,σ0)∼
′
j (w1,σ1) iff w0 ∼ j w1 and σ0 ≈ j σ1,
• (w,σ) ∈V ′(p) iff w ∈V (p).
Thus, the states of the updated model consist of those state-action pairs (w,σ) such that the precondition
of the action σ is satisfied by the state w in M; intuitively, (w,σ) represents the state of the world
w after σ has been performed. The definition of V ′ ensures that such “updated states” satisfy the same
primitive propositions as they did before (corresponding to the intuition that epistemic actions can change
the information agents have access to, but cannot change basic facts about the world). Finally, the
definition of ∼′j specifies that updated state-action pairs are indistinguishable for agent j precisely when
the constituent states and actions were indistinguishable for j in M and A, respectively. It is easy to see
that MA is an epistemic model.
The language for Action Logic, LAL, extends the basic epistemic language with an update operator:
ϕ := p |¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ψ |K jϕ | [A,σ ]ϕ .
[A,σ ]ϕ is read “if action σ can be performed, then afterwards, ϕ is true”.2 This language therefore lets
us reason about agents’ knowledge and how it can change as a result of epistemic actions. Formulas
of LAL can be interpreted in epistemic models as before, with the additional semantic clause for [A,σ ]
given by:
(M,w)  [A,σ ]ϕ iff (M,w)  Pre(σ) implies (MA,(w,σ))  ϕ .
To make these definitions clear, we present a simple example that will recur in various forms through-
out the paper.
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Figure 1: M0 – Anne and Bob’s initial uncertainty
Example 1. Colleagues Anne and Bob are discussing whether a particular company policy passed in
this morning’s board meeting: both are ignorant of whether or not the policy passed. Taking p to be the
proposition “the policy passed”, this scenario may be represented with the simple epistemic model M0
presented in Figure 1.3
In this diagram and others like it, the circles represents the states of the model (in this case, w0 and
w1), the formulas listed beside a state are true at that state (in this case, p and ¬p are true at w0 and w1,
respectively), and edges between states are labelled with those agents that cannot distinguish those states
(in this case, the edge labelled with a and b indicates that neither Anne nor Bob can distinguish between
these two possible worlds). Indeed, we have M0  (¬Ka p∧¬Ka¬p)∧ (¬Kbp∧¬Kb¬p), so this model
properly captures the ignorance of Anne and Bob regarding p.
Along comes Carl, fresh from the board meeting with news of whether the policy passed. He takes
one of two actions: he either tells Bob that p is true (σp), or he tells Bob that p is false (σ¬p). Anne
watches intently: she knows that Carl is telling Bob what happened, but she is too far away to hear
what Carl actually reports. We presume that Carl is honest, so the precondition of σp is p, and the
precondition of σ¬p is ¬p. This is all captured in the action model A0 depicted in Figure 2, where the
circles represent actions, the formulas listed beside the actions are the corresponding preconditions, and
the edges represent action indistinguishability.
Figure 2: A0 – Carl’s communication to Bob
In particular, Anne cannot distinguish σp from σ¬p (though she knows that one of them happened),
while Bob can. We therefore arrive at the following updated model M
A0
0 given in Figure 3. Thus we see
that when we update the epistemic model with the action model, the result is a model where Bob knows
whether or not p, while Anne does not: M
A0
0  Kb p∨Kb¬p, and M
A0
0  ¬(Ka p∨Ka¬p), as desired.
Note that Carl’s announcement is not public since Anne cannot tell whether he announced p or ¬p
2The “if-then” construction here is interpreted as a standard material conditional, i.e., [A,σ ]ϕ is vacuously true when σ
cannot be performed.
3Unless stated otherwise, all relations are equivalence relations, so reflexive loops and edges implied by transitivity are
assumed to be present, even when suppressed in the diagrams.
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Figure 3: M
A0
0 – After Carl’s announcement
while Bob can.4 This demonstrates that AL can capture epistemic dynamics that PAL cannot.5
Nonetheless, as we have claimed, AL suffers from limitations of its own; we turn now to a discussion
of these limitations.
2.1 Limitations of action logic
The limitations we have in mind can be summarized quite simply: the AL framework treats the action
model as common knowledge. Indeed, the updated model MA imports much of the structure of the ac-
tion model: in it, all agents come to know what actions the other agents can distinguish. The result is
that AL has difficulty capturing scenarios involving higher-order uncertainty—e.g., uncertainty about
what other agents know. Although this limitation can be overcome, in a sense, by expanding the action
model, we will see that in general this is not an appealing solution. Moreover, the examples we consider
demonstrate that the AL framework is not as modular as it might appear to be: adjustments to the epis-
temic model will often require corresponding adjustments to the action model to preserve the intended
semantic interpretations. To illustrate these points, we return to the scenario presented in Example 1.
Example 2. Suppose again that Carl comes along with news of p; however, instead of speaking so that
only Bob can hear him, Carl speaks plainly for all to hear, but he delivers the message in French. As it
happens, Bob speaks French and Anne does not.
As before, the apparent actions that Carl might take are telling Bob that p and telling Bob that ¬p,
which presumably have preconditions p and ¬p, respectively. Bob can distinguish these actions, as he
speaks French, while Anne cannot. This reasoning produces the same action model A0 depicted in Figure
2, which therefore produces the same updated model M
A0
0 shown in Figure 3. As expected, then, just as in
Example 1, Bob ends up knowing whether or not p, and Anne does not. An unexpected result, however,
is that Anne knows this former fact, and Bob knows the latter! That is, we have:
M
A0
0  Ka(Kb p∨Kb¬p)
and
M
A0
0  Kb(¬(Ka p∨Ka¬p)).
The former says that Anne knows that Bob knows whether p, while the latter says that Bob knows that
Anne is uncertain about p. But there was no assumption that Bob knows that Anne cannot understand
Carl’s message, nor that Anne knows that Bob can. That is, we did not explicitly stipulate whether or not
either knew about the other’s (in)ability to speak French. To capture this, the model must be refined.
4This particular sort of non-public announcement is sometimes referred to as “semi-private” in the literature.
5In fact, AL subsumes PAL: to capture a public announcement of ϕ , consider the action model Aϕ consisting of a single
node σ with the precondition ϕ . Then, given an epistemic model M and a state w therein, one can show that the resulting
models (MAϕ ,(w,σ)) and (M|ϕ ,w) are bisimilar: updating with Aϕ effectively deletes the states in M where ϕ is false.
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Loosely speaking, Bob’s ability to speak French and Anne’s inability to speak French are represented
in the structure of the action model A0 in Figure 2, and this is why they effectively become common
knowledge in the updated model. But, of course, we may want to capture a scenario where one or both
are uncertain about whether or not the other speaks French; indeed, uncertainties of this sort play an
important role in everyday reasoning.
For the sake of simplicity, let us begin by aiming only to remove the consequence in the updated
model that Anne knows that Bob knows whether p.
Example 3. A relevant proposition here is that Bob speaks French; call this q. If we wish to account for
Anne’s uncertainty about q, we ought to expand the initial epistemic model M0 to include the possible
values this proposition might have. The result is the model M1 depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4: M1 – An expanded model of Anne and Bob’s initial uncertainty
Anne does not know whether or not p is true, and also does not know whether or not q is true; thus,
there are a-edges between all 4 nodes. We assume that Bob does know whether or not he speaks French,
but, as before, does not know whether or not p; thus there are horizontal b-edges, but no vertical b-edges.
It is easy to check that updating M1 with A0 produces an epistemic model M
A0
1 in which Bob knows
(at every state) the true value of p. So it seems we must modify the action model as well; we add
a third action, σ , corresponding intuitively to the “unsuccessful” announcement in which Carl speaks
his piece but no one (including Bob) understands him. The precondition for σ should therefore be
¬q: that Bob does not speak French. Furthermore, the preconditions for the actions σp and σ¬p ought
to be strengthened to include q, since these actions now represent Carl telling Bob p or ¬p and Bob
understanding what was said. Bob will be able to distinguish any of these three actions, since he knows
whether or not he speaks French, and, given that he speaks French, he knows which announcement Carl
is making. Anne, on the hand, will not be able to distinguish any of the three actions—it all sounds the
same to her. All this is captured by the action model A1 given in Figure 5.
Figure 5: A1 – An expanded action model
The updated model M
A1
1 is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: MA11 – After Carl’s announcement
As expected, we now have that Bob knows whether p only in those nodes where σp or σ¬p was
performed, and Anne does not know whether p at all. Furthermore, we have:
(w0,σp)  Kˆa(Kb p∨Kb¬p)∧ Kˆa(¬Kbp∧¬Kb¬p)
This reads: Anne considers it possible that Bob knows whether or not p, and also considers it possible
that he does not. Thus, by expanding the initial epistemic model to include Anne’s uncertainty about
Bob’s ability to speak French, as well as adding a third node to the action model corresponding (roughly
speaking) to an “unsuccessful” announcement from Carl, we are able to capture the second-order uncer-
tainty that we set out to capture.
One might reasonably feel some discomfort regarding the introduction of σ into the action model.
On at least one intuition for what constitutes an “action”, Carl’s announcement (in French) of p ought to
count as the same action regardless of who hears it or what languages they might understand. In other
words, one might object to distinguishing σp from σ on the grounds that it builds into the ontology of
actions properties that really have nothing to do with actions, but rather with agents.
This philosophical objection could perhaps be swept aside if the underlying formalism actually did
the job we wanted it to: it is a hard case to make to let vague ontological concerns trump mathematical
efficacy. What we now aim to demonstrate, however, is that this technique of expanding the action model
is not an effective tool for capturing higher-order uncertainty.
Example 4. We alter the scenario of Examples 2 and 3 in only one respect: we assume now that Anne
does speak French. This requires no change to the intial epistemic model M1 (since whether or not Anne
speaks French is not represented explicitly in this model), but it does, intuitively, require us to re-work
the action model A1. In particular, the Anne-edge connecting σp and σ¬p no longer seems appropriate,
since now Anne can understand what Carl announces.
Now we are faced with a somewhat awkward question—should there be an Anne-edge between σp
and σ? Intuitively, there should be, since σ is supposed to encode the fact that Bob does not understand
Carl’s announcement, and Anne is not supposed to be able to tell whether he does or not. Similar
reasoning leads us to leave the Anne-edge between σ¬p and σ in place, so the resulting relation fails to
be transitive.
Perhaps we could relax the requirements placed on the relations ≈i in action models to accommodate
this type of problem, but in fact there is a deeper issue here that suggests an alternative resolution:
it is easy to see that any reflexive relation ≈′a for Anne on the set {σp,σ¬p,σ} produces an action
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model A′1 such that the updated model M
A′1
1 satisfies (w2,σ) ∼a (w3,σ). But this misrepresents the
situation: in world w2, Carl’s announcement must have been that the policy passed, p; as such, after his
announcement, Anne should no longer be uncertain about p.
The problem here lies with σ : it was introduced originally to represent the possibility of an “un-
successful” announcement by Carl. But in the present context, Carl’s announcement is always at least
partially successful, in that it always informs Anne of the truth value of p. The natural fix to this problem
is another adjustment to the action model: we “split” the action σ into two actions, σ¬p¬q and σp¬q (and
relabel the other actions for clarity). The new action model A2 is given in Figure 7.
Figure 7: A2 – The adjusted action model for when Anne speaks French.
These new actions σp¬q and σ¬p¬q might be thought of as corresponding to situations where Carl
announces p and Bob does not understand, and where Carl announces ¬p and Bob does not understand,
respectively. Anne can distinguish announcements based on their content, but not based on whether
Bob understands them. Bob can distinguish announcements based on whether he understands them and,
provided he understands them, based on their content as well. The updated model M
A2
1 is given in Figure
8. As expected, Anne has learned whether or not p in the updated model (since she heard Carl), but she
Figure 8: M
A2
1 – The updated model when Anne speaks French.
continues to be ignorant as to whether or not Bob speaks French (and, in turn, whether or not Bob has
learned p).
Note the duplication of effort in the construction of A2. The initial epistemic model M1 already
encodes the possibilities regarding Bob’s ability to speak French and Anne’s uncertainty about this. Yet
our action model recapitulates this structure with actions that incorporate not just what Carl says, but
also whether Bob understands it or not. Moreover, once our background assumptions are fixed (such
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as whether Anne understands French or not), edges (and nodes!) in A2 are determined, essentially, by
examining M1 and reading off what the uncertainties ought to be. Thus, while AL gives the impression
of a clean, modular division between epistemic states and actions, in practice the two seems to be quite
tangled, with unavoidable redundancies in their representations. To drive this point home, we sketch one
further example.
Example 5. Consider an expanded epistemic model M2 in which we take not just Bob’s but also Anne’s
knowledge of French as endogenous: that is, suppose we also wish to represent Bob as being uncertain
of whether or not Anne speaks French. A simple model of such a scenario might consist in eight worlds
representing the possible combinations of truth values for primitive propostions p, q, and r, where p and
q are interpreted as before and r stands for the proposition “Anne speaks French”.
The action model A2 of Example 4 is again inadequate. To see why, consider whether there ought
to be an Anne-edge connecting σp and σ¬p. Intuitively, whether Anne can distinguish Carl announcing
p from Carl announcing ¬p depends on the world (i.e., it depends on whether or not Anne can speak
French); it is not a fixed and unchanging truth that can be hard-coded into the model. As such, in order
to capture this with a fixed action model we require, yet again, a proliferation of actions: e.g., actions of
the form σpq¬r, corresponding to something like Carl announcing p and Bob but not Anne understanding
it.
These examples make it clear that the AL formalism is not well-suited to the practical task of building
models to represent scenarios in which second-order knowledge is relevant: in addition to specifying
the initial epistemic model, one must construct alongside it an elaborate space of actions fine-tuned to
the specifics of the epistemic setting. These actions, rather than corresponding in a natural way with
concrete events in the world (like Carl making an announcement), are individuated by details about
agents’ perceptions of them that seem less like part of the actions themselves and more like part of the
background epistemics of the situation. We turn now to our proposed solution to this problem, which
simplifies the action space considerably and imports the representation of higher-order uncertainty into
the epistemic model, which is designed to handle it.
3 Adjusted Semantics
We propose a new semantics for modeling information update that subsumes AL and is able to cap-
ture higher-order uncertainty without the proliferation of actions illustrated in the previous section. In
essence, we endogenize the action model, making the distinguishability of the actions world-dependent.
It is therefore natural in our revised framework to drop the notion of a separate action model altogether.
In addition to a countable collection of primitive propositions PROP and a finite set of agents G,
fix a set Σ of epistemic actions together with a precondition function Pre : Σ → LEL specifying the
precondition for each action as before. A dynamic model (over (Σ,Pre)) is a tuple
M = 〈W,{∼ j: j ∈ G},{ f j : j ∈ G},V 〉
where 〈W,{∼ j: j ∈ G},V 〉 is an epistemic model, and for each agent j, f j : W → 2
Σ×Σ is a function
from worlds to relations on actions. Intuitively, (σ1,σ2) ∈ f j(w) means that at world w, if action σ1 is
performed, then agent j cannot rule out σ2 being the action performed. The f j functions are the crucial
novel component of our framework which allow action indistinguishability to vary from world to world.
We will use dynamic models to interpret the language LDL recursively defined by
ϕ := p |¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ψ |K jϕ | [σ ]ϕ ,
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where [σ ]ϕ is read, as before, “if action σ can be performed, then afterwards, ϕ is true”.6 Of course, in
order to interpret the update modalities, we must define the notion of an updated model. Let
M+ = 〈W+,{∼+j : j ∈ G},{ f
+
j : j ∈ G},V
+〉,7
where:
W+ = {(w,σ) : w  Pre(σ)}
(w,σ)∼+j (w
′
,σ ′) ⇔ w∼ j w
′ and (σ ,σ ′) ∈ f j(w)
f+j (w,σ) = f j(w)
(w,σ) ∈V+(p) ⇔ w ∈V (p).
It is easy to see that M+ is itself a dynamic model over (Σ,Pre) provided the relations ∼+j are equivalence
relations. In general, this need not be the case; however, the following conditions guarantee that it is.
(C1) If w∼ j w
′, then f j(w) = f j(w
′).
(C2) Each f j(w) is an equivalence relation on Σ.
Proposition 6. (C1) and (C2) together imply that M+ is a dynamic model.
Proof. As noted, it suffices to show that ∼+j is an equivalence relation. Reflexivity follows immediately
from reflexivity of ∼ j and f j(w). For symmetry, suppose that (w,σ)∼
+
j (w
′,σ ′). Then w ∼ j w
′ so also
w′ ∼ j w; moreover, by (C1) we have (σ ,σ
′) ∈ f j(w) = f j(w
′), so (C2) implies (σ ′,σ) ∈ f j(w
′), whence
(w′,σ ′) ∼+j (w,σ). For transitivity, suppose that (w,σ) ∼
+
j (w
′,σ ′) and (w′,σ ′) ∼+j (w
′′,σ ′′). Clearly
w∼ j w
′′. Moreover, we have (σ ,σ ′)∈ f j(w) and (σ
′,σ ′′)∈ f j(w
′); by (C1) f j(w) = f j(w
′), and by (C2)
this relation is transitive, so we deduce that (σ ,σ ′′) ∈ f j(w), which shows that (w,σ) ∼
+
j (w
′′,σ ′′), as
desired.8
Henceforth, we assume (C1) and (C2). Now define
(M,w)  [σ ]ϕ iff (M,w)  Pre(σ) implies (M+,(w,σ))  ϕ .
This completes our specification of the new semantics for epistemic actions. It is not hard to see that
update by an action model is essentially a special case of update in this framework: given an action
model A, one simply defines each f j to be the constant function such that f j(w) = ≈ j.
9 This directly
realizes the intuition that the action model is common knowledge in AL.
6We no longer need to “tag” the update modality with an action model since our framework does not employ action models;
this turns out to have important implications in our proof of completeness.
7This notation does not specify which action σ the update is being performed with respect to, since (as in AL) our update
procedure effectively performs all available updates simultaneously.
8In fact, condition (C1) is stronger than it needs to be to establish Proposition 6: since ∼ j is assumed to be symmetric;
weakening (C1) to:
(C1∗) If w∼ j w
′, then f j(w)⊆ f j(w
′)
has no effect. Of course, this argument would not work for weaker epistemic logics where agents are not assumed to be
negatively introspective and ∼ j is not assumed to be symmetric. Exploring the interplay between properties of the relations ∼ j
and properties of the functions f j is intriguing, but takes us too far afield in the present work.
9Successive updates by different action models A1, . . . ,An can be recast as repeated updates by the same action model A,
where A is an appropriate disjoint union of the Ak’s.
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3.1 Revisiting the examples
We now revisit the problematic examples of Section 2.1 and show that the new framework we have
developed actually addresses the deficiencies we demonstrated. Let Σ = {σp,σ¬p} and set Pre(σp) = p
and Pre(σ¬p) = ¬p, corresponding to the two intuitive actions of Carl announcing p or announcing ¬p,
respectively. Recall that in Examples 2 and 3, Carl delivers his message in French, we assume that Anne
does not know French, and we let q represent the proposition that Bob knows French. We therefore
define the dynamic model M˜1 that we will use to reason about this scenario by extending the epistemic
model M1 depicted in Figure 4. In particular, we set
• fa(w0) = fa(w1) = fa(w2) = fa(w3) = Σ×Σ,
• fb(w0) = fb(w1) = idΣ, and
• fb(w2) = fb(w3) = Σ×Σ,
where idX denotes the identity relation on X . Thus, this dynamic model encodes the fact that Anne can
never distinguish the two actions, whereas Bob can distinguish them just in case he speaks French. It is
easy to see that (the epistemic part of) M˜+1 looks exactly like the model M
A1
1 depicted in Figure 6, except
with the nodes (w2,σ) and (w3,σ) relabeled (w2,σp) and (w3,σ¬p), respectively. In other words, our
update produces the “right” epistemic results, and it does so using a simple and natural set of actions and
without requiring any fine-tuning of the model beyond the basic association between worlds where Bob
speaks French and worlds where he can distinguish Carl’s two possible announcements.
Next consider the scenario of Example 4, which is just like the previous one except it is assumed that
Anne does speak French. To capture this, we need only change one line of the previous specifications
for M˜1:
• fa(w0) = fa(w1) = fa(w2) = fa(w3) = idΣ.
This corresponds directly to the assumption that Anne knows French (i.e., this is valid in the model), so
she can always distinguish the two actions in question. Call this dynamic model M˜′1. Now as before,
it is straightforward to check that (the epistemic part of) M˜′+1 looks exactly like the model M
A2
1 given
in Figure 8, provided we replace every instance of σpq and σp¬q with σp, and every instance of σ¬pq
and σ¬p¬q with σ¬p. So again, without the confusion of defining new, abstract actions, our framework
reproduces the intended epistemic consequences of Carl’s announcement.
Finally, it is not hard to figure out how to define a dynamic model M˜2 extending the epistemic model
M2 of Example 5:
• fa(w) =
{
idΣ if w  r
Σ×Σ if w  ¬r,
• fb(w) =
{
idΣ if w  q
Σ×Σ if w  ¬q.
4 Axiomatization
Our approach here follows much of the literature in seeking an axiomatization by way of reduction
schemes that effectively transform statements in LDL into equivalent statements in some other language,
and then axiomatizing that other language. Unlike PAL, however, it is easy to show that we cannot hope
to reduce LDL to the basic epistemic language LEL—it is easy to produce pairs of dynamic models
whose epistemic parts are bisimilar but which satisfy different formulas of LDL at bisimilar worlds.
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Let L +DL and L
+
EL denote the languages LDL and LEL, respectively, augmented with additional
primitive formulas ξ j,σ ,σ ′ for each j ∈G and σ ,σ
′ ∈ Σ. Interpret these new formulas in dynamic models
as follows:
(M,w)  ξ j,σ ,σ ′ iff (σ ,σ
′) ∈ f j(w).
Intuitively, ξ j,σ ,σ ′ says that if action σ is performed, agent j cannot rule out that σ
′ was the action
performed. Thus, L +EL can talk about both knowledge of the agents and action indistinguishability.
Somewhat surprisingly, LDL is reducible to L
+
EL: every formula of LDL is equivalent to a formula
in L +EL, and this equivalence can be captured by reduction schemes that allow us to provide a sound
and complete axiomatization of L +DL with respect to the class of all dynamic models that satisfy (C1)
and (C2). It can be shown, however, that L +DL is strictly more expressive than LDL, so this result leaves
something to be desired. This is the subject of ongoing research.
4.1 Soundness and completeness of L +EL
Fix a finite set of actions Σ together with a precondition function Pre : Σ →LEL. We begin by axioma-
tizing L +EL and then turn to L
+
DL. Consider the following axioms:
1. All instantiations of propositional tautologies
2. Ka(ϕ → ψ)→ (Kaϕ → Kaψ)
3. Kaϕ → ϕ
4. Kaϕ → KaKaϕ
5. ¬Kaϕ → Ka¬Kaϕ
6. ξ axioms:
(a) ξ j,σ ,σ
(b) ξ j,σ ,σ ′ → ξ j,σ ′,σ
(c) ξ j,σ ,σ ′ → (ξ j,σ ′,σ ′′ → ξ j,σ ,σ ′′)
7. Interaction axiom:10
(a) ξ j,σ ,σ ′ → K jξ j,σ ,σ ′
8. From ϕ and ϕ → ψ , infer ψ .
9. From ϕ , infer K jϕ .
Soundness is easy, while completeness can be established by a fairly standard canonical model con-
struction. Let Mc = 〈W c,{∼cj : j ∈ G},{ f
c
j : j ∈ G},V
c〉 be defined as follows:
• Mc = {Γ⊆L +EL : Γ is maximally consistent}
• Γ∼cj ∆ iff {K jϕ : K jϕ ∈ Γ}= {K jϕ : K jϕ ∈ ∆}
• (σ ,σ ′) ∈ f cj (Γ) iff ξ j,σ ,σ ′ ∈ Γ
• Γ ∈V c(p) iff p ∈ Γ.
10In fact, the scheme ¬ξ j,σ ,σ ′ → K j¬ξ j,σ ,σ ′ is also valid, but it can be proved from 7(a) together with the S5 axioms for K j.
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We must show that Mc is a dynamic model over (Σ,Pre). That ∼cj is an equivalence relation follows
from standard proofs of the completeness of S5. We show that f cj satisfies conditions (C1) and (C2).
(C1) Suppose that Γ∼cj ∆; we show that f
c
j (Γ) = f
c
j (∆). Since∼
c
j is an equivalence relation, suppose
without loss of generality that (σ ,σ ′) ∈ f cj (Γ). Then ξ j,σ ,σ ′ ∈ Γ. By axiom 7a, K jξ j,σ ,σ ′ ∈ Γ; by the way
that ∼cj is defined, we know then that K jξ j,σ ,σ ′ ∈ ∆. Finally, by axiom 3, we have that ξ j,σ ,σ ′ ∈ ∆, which
gives the desired result that (σ ,σ ′) ∈ f cj (∆).
(C2) follows easily from the ξ axioms.
The equivalence
(Mc,Γ)  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Γ
(i.e., the Truth Lemma) is proved in the standard way by structural induction.
4.2 Soundness and completeness of L +DL
Let preσ abbreviate the epistemic formula Pre(σ), and consider the following additional axioms:
10. Action axioms:
(a) [σ ](ϕ → ψ)→ ([σ ]ϕ → [σ ]ψ)
(b) [σ ]p↔ (preσ → p)
(c) [σ ]¬ϕ ↔ (preσ →¬[σ ]ϕ)
(d) [σ ](ϕ ∧ψ)↔ ([σ ]ϕ ∧ [σ ]ψ)
(e) [σ ]Kaϕ ↔
(
preσ →
∧
σ ′∈Σ
(ξa,σ ,σ ′ → Ka[σ
′]ϕ)
)
11. From ϕ , infer [σ ]ϕ .
The soundness of most of the above axioms is immediate; we show the soundness of (10e).
(⇒) Suppose that (M,w)  [σ ]Kaϕ and assume that (M,w)  preσ (otherwise the equivalence is
trivial). Let σ ′ ∈ Σ be such that w  ξa,σ ,σ ′ and consider any world w
′ with w ∼a w
′. We wish to show
that w′  [σ ′]ϕ . We know that (M+,(w,σ))  Kaϕ . Since w  ξa,σ ,σ ′ , we also know that (σ ,σ
′) ∈ fa(w),
so (w,σ)∼+a (w
′,σ ′); it follows that (w′,σ ′)  ϕ , which means that w′  [σ ′]ϕ .
(⇐) Suppose that w  preσ →
∧
σ ′∈Σ(ξa,σ ,σ ′ → Ka[σ
′]ϕ), and that w  preσ . We wish to show that
(w,σ)  Kaϕ . Consider any (w
′,σ ′) ∼+a (w,σ); we will show that (w
′,σ ′)  ϕ . Since (σ ,σ ′) ∈ fa(w),
we know that w  ξa,σ ,σ ′ , so by assumption, w  Ka[σ
′]ϕ . Then since w∼a w
′, we have that w′  [σ ′]ϕ ,
which implies that (w′,σ ′)  ϕ , as desired.
For completeness, consider the following translation:
W. Nalls & A. Bjorndahl 439
t(p) = p
t(ξ j,σ ,σ ′) = ξ j,σ ,σ ′
t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ∧ψ) = t(ϕ)∧ t(ψ)
t(Kaϕ) = Kat(ϕ)
t([σ ]p) = preσ → p
t([σ ]¬ϕ) = preσ →¬t([σ ]ϕ)
t([σ ](ϕ ∧ψ)) = t([σ ]ϕ)∧ t([σ ]ψ)
t([σ ]Kaϕ) = preσ →
∧
σ ′∈Σ
(ξa,σ ,σ ′ → Ka t([σ
′]ϕ))
t([σ ][σ ′]ϕ) = t([σ ]t([σ ′]ϕ))
Proposition 7. For all formulas ϕ ∈L +DL, t(ϕ) is provably equivalent to ϕ and t(ϕ) ∈L
+
EL.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the action nesting depth of ϕ , defined in the obvious way:
d(p) = 0
d(ξ j,σ ,σ ′) = 0
d(¬ϕ) = d(ϕ)
d(ϕ ∧ψ) = max(d(ϕ),d(ψ))
d(K jϕ) = d(ϕ)
d([σ ]ϕ) = d(ϕ)+1.
The case d(ϕ) = 0 is immediate. So suppose the result holds for all formulas with nesting depth less
than n, and let ϕ ∈L +DL be such that d(ϕ)≤ n.
We now proceed via a subinduction on the weight of ϕ , defined as follows:
w(p) = 1
w(ξ j,σ ,σ ′) = 1
w(¬ϕ) = w(ϕ)+1
w(ϕ ∧ψ) = max(w(ϕ),w(ψ))+1
w(K jϕ) = w(ϕ)+1
w([σ ]ϕ) = w(ϕ)+1
The base case where w(ϕ) = 1 is again immediate. So suppose inductively the result holds for formulas
of weight less than w(ϕ). The proof now breaks into cases depending on the structure of ϕ , since this
determines which recursive clause of the definition of t is relevant. The inducutive steps corresponding
to the Boolean connectives and the Ka modalities are straightforward, so we move to the case where
ϕ = [σ ]ψ ; this in turn naturally breaks into several subcases depending on the structure of ψ :
• If ψ = p, then t(ϕ) = t([σ ]p) = preσ → p and we are done by axiom (10b).
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• If ψ = ¬χ , then t(ϕ) = t([σ ]¬χ) = preσ → ¬t([σ ]χ). Clearly w([σ ]χ) < w(ϕ), so by the in-
ductive hypothesis we know that t([σ ]χ) ∈ L +EL and is provably equivalent to [σ ]χ . It follows
immediately that t(ϕ) ∈L +EL and, by axiom (10c), that t(ϕ) is provably equivalent to ϕ .
• If ψ = χ1∧ χ2, then t(ϕ) = t([σ ]χ1)∧ t([σ ]χ2). Clearly w([σ ]χ1)< w(ϕ) and w([σ ]χ2)< w(ϕ),
so by the inductive hypothesis we know that t([σ ]χ1) ∈ L
+
EL and t([σ ]χ2) ∈ L
+
EL, and they are
provably equivalent to [σ ]χ1 and [σ ]χ2, respectively. It follows immediately that t(ϕ) ∈L
+
EL and,
by axiom (10d), that t(ϕ) is provably equivalent to ϕ .
• If ψ = K jχ , then t(ϕ) = t([σ ]K jχ) = preσ →
∧
σ ′∈Σ(ξ j,σ ,σ ′ → K j t([σ
′]χ)). Clearly, for each
σ ′ ∈ Σ, w([σ ′]χ) < w(ϕ), so by the inductive hypothesis we know that t([σ ′]χ) ∈ L +EL and is
provably equivalent to [σ ′]χ . It follows immediately that t(ϕ) ∈ L +EL and, by axiom (10e), that
t(ϕ) is provably equivalent to ϕ , as desired.
• Finally, if ψ = [σ ′]χ , then t(ϕ)= t([σ ][σ ′]χ)= t([σ ]t([σ ′]χ)). Let ψ˜ = t([σ ′]χ); clearly w([σ ′]χ)<
w(ϕ), so by the inductive hypothesis we know that ψ˜ = t([σ ′]χ) ∈L +EL and ψ˜ is provably equiv-
alent to [σ ′]χ . So we have t(ϕ) = t([σ ]t([σ ′]χ)) = t([σ ]ψ˜). Now the weight of ψ˜ may be very
large, so we can’t apply our inner inductive hypothesis again here. However, since ψ˜ ∈ L +EL, it
is easy to see that d([σ ]ψ˜) = 1 < d(ϕ), so we can appeal to our outer inductive hypothesis to
conclude that t(ϕ) = t([σ ]ψ˜) ∈ L +EL and is provably equivalent to [σ ]ψ˜ . Moreover, since ψ˜ is
provably equivalent to [σ ′]χ , using axiom (10a) it is easy to show that [σ ]ψ˜ is provably equivalent
to [σ ][σ ′]χ , whence t(ϕ) is provably equivalent to ϕ , as desired.
Completeness is an immediate corollary.
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